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NOTES 
The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities ~ct on State 
Bar Examiners' Inquiries Into the Psychological History 
of Bar Applicants 
Carol J. Banta 
OORODUCTION 
Bar examiners, as the designated gatekeepers of the legal pro-
fession, are responsible for protecting the public from unfit attor-
neys. Because attorneys interact with and serve the public in a 
profession that requires responsibility and trustworthiness, bar ap-
plicants are subject to especially rigorous screening.1 In determin-
ing the fitness of candidates for the practice of law, state boards of 
bar examiners. follow a two-pronged approach, consisting of a writ-
ten examination to test legal knowledge and a character and fitness 
assessment.2 Bar examiners investigate applicants thoroughly, in-
quiring as to personal traits and background information that would 
not be as relevant for other positions.3 As part of the fitness assess-
ment, inquiries into the applicants' mental health histories are com-
mon.4 Bar examining boards in forty-three states and the District 
of Columbia use some form of psychological history inquiry.s 
Mental health questions take several possible forms, varying 
both in subject matter and in the scope of the time period about 
which they inquire. In terms of subject matter, the broadest type of 
question asks whether the applicant has received treatment or 
counseling from a medical professional for any psychological condi-
tion or substance abuse.6 Some questions ask only whether the ap-
plicant has ever been dependent on drugs or alcohol, as 
1. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 75 (Fla. 1983); see also 
Thomas A. Pobjecky, Everything You Wanted to Know About Bar Admissions and Psychiat-
ric Problems But Were Too Paranoid to Ask, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1989, at 14, 21 (arguing that 
by approving an individual, bar examiners represent to the public that the person is fit and 
competent to practice). 
2. See, e.g., RJ. Gerber, Moral Character: Inquiries Without Character, B. EXAMINER, 
May 1988, at 13, 13. 
3. Florida Bd., 443 So. 2d at 75. 
4. Gerber, supra note 2, at 13; Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional 
Credentia~ 94 YALE L.J. 491, 581 (1985). 
5. See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 436-37, 438-40 & nn.16-
19 (E.D. Va. 1995) (providing each jurisdiction's question(s)). 
6. See, e.g., Clark, BSD F. Supp. at 440 n.19 (quoting such questions from a variety of 
states). 
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distinguished from questions about treatment or diagnosis.7 Other 
questions focus more narrowly on actual diagnosis of a psychologi-
cal problem or on specified psychological problems, or on both.s 
With respect to the relevant time periods, state bars often place no 
time limit on the questions, asking whether applicants have "ever" 
received treatment, been institutionalized, and so on.9 Some 
boards of bar examiners limit the time period subject to inquiry to a 
specific number of years.10 
Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (ADA),11 bar examiners across the nation have debated the 
Act's impact on the use of mental health inquiries in bar applica-
tions.12 In some cases they have amended their questions to ad-
dress concerns that such inquiries may violate the ADA.13 For 
example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals changed the 
D.C. bar application in February 1992, eliminating a question about 
past treatment for mental illness and putting a five-year limit on 
7. See, e.g., Thomas A. Pobjecky, Mental Health Inquiries: To Ask, or Not to Ask - That 
Is the Question, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1992, at 31, 31 (quoting question 26 of the Florida bar 
application, which asks: "Are you or have you ever been addicted to or dependent upon the 
use of narcotics, drugs, or intoxicating beverages?"); cf. Medical Socy. v. Jacobs, No. 
CIV.A.93-3670, 1993 WL 413016, at *l (D.NJ. Oct. 5, 1993) (quoting question 7 of the initial 
application to the New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners, which asked: "Have you 
ever been dependent on alcohol or Controlled Dangerous Substances?"). 
8. The North Carolina and Wisconsin bar applications, for example, ask about diagnosis. 
See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 440 n.19 (quoting the North Carolina and WJSconsin questions). 
Bar examiners in Florida, Maine and Texas are among those that focus on certain conditions. 
See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 439-40 n.18 (quoting the Florida, Maine, and Texas questions); see 
also Applicants v. Texas State Bd. of Law Examiners, No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 
776693, at *10 n.5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1993) (quoting the Texas question). 
An even more specific type of question involves treatment for more serious psychological 
problems, such as voluntary or involuntary commitment to a mental hospital or institution, or 
judicial determination of incompetence. See, e.g., Clark, 880 F. Supp. 438-39 n.16 (quoting 
such questions from a variety of states). 
9. See, e.g., Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 440 n.19 {listing states which ask such questions). 
10. See, e.g., Clark, 880 F. Supp. 438-39 n.16 (referring to questions of this type); Texas 
State Bd., 1994 WL 776693 at *10 n.5 (quoting the Texas question). 
11. Pub. L No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 
(Supp. V 1993)). 
12. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Bar Examiners Respond to the ADA, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, 
at 20, 20 {"The ADA is 'a hot topic among bar examiners' these days •••• " (quoting 
Armando Menocal, past president of the National Conference of Bar Examiners)). Both the 
American Bar Association and the National Council of Bar Examiners have recently 
changed their policies to reflect ADA considerations. See Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 440 (noting 
the organizations' actions). 
13. At least eight states have revised their mental health inquiries in response to ADA 
litigation or the threat thereof: Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas. Clark, 880 F. Supp. at 440. Several other states claim to 
be reconsidering their questions. Wade Lambert, Bar Debates Screening Out Mentally Ill, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1995, at Bl. 
Erica Moeser, president of the National Conference of Bar Examiners, has argued that 
bar examiners are narrowing the scope of inquiry to "zero in on raging and risky, chronic and 
serious" psychological problems. Erica Moeser, Should Bar Applicants Be Asked About 
Treatment for Mental Health?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 36, 36. 
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two questions about drug or alcohol treatment and about hospitali-
zation for mental illness.14 The New York State Bar took a differ-
ent approach in changing its questions, eliminating a question 
regarding past commitment, institutionalization, or incompetence 
and replacing it with two questions: one asking about any condition 
that could adversely affect capability to practice and one asking 
about current use of illegal drugs.1s An increasing number of law-
suits challenging the legality of psychological history inquiries16 are 
forcing bar examiners and courts to consider the impact of the 
ADA and alternatives to mental health questions. 
'I\vo federal district courts have recently ruled on challenges to 
revised questions. In Applicants v. Texas State Board of Law Exam-
iners, 11 the court rejected an ADA challenge to a question about 
diagnosis of or treatment for certain disorders within the previous 
ten years.18 The court held that the inquiry was "necessary" for the 
investigation of bar applicants' fitness.19 A few months later, the 
14. DeBenedictis, supra note 12, at 20; Charles L. Reischel, The Constitution, the Disabil-
ity Act, and Questions About Alcoholism, Addiction, and Mental Health, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 
1992, at 10, 10 & 22 n.3; Rosalind Resnick, Groups Criticize Bar on Mental Histories, NATL. 
LJ., May 18, 1992, at 3, 3; Thomas Scheffey, Applicant Claims Bar Query Violates ADA, 
CoNN. L. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1992, at 1. But see Pobjecky, supra note 7, at 34 (arguing that the 
change was "not supported by any reasonable interpretation of the ADA" and should be 
viewed as a "policy decision"; the court's decision "should not be viewed as a persuasive (let 
alone authoritative) interpretation of the ADA"). 
The revised questions still rely on psychological status, a basis that this Note argues vio-
lates the ADA. 
15. See Campbell v. Greisberger, 865 F. Supp. 115, 117 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting the 
change). Because the ADA does not protect current use of illegal drugs, see infra note 37, 
and does permit questions about actual capability, see infra notes 105-07 and accompanying 
text, the revised questions do not violate the ADA. 
16. E.g., Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995); Mc-
cready v. Illinois Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, No. 94-C-3582, 1995 WL 29609 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
24, 1995); Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Camp-
bell v. Greisberger, 865 F. Supp. 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Underwood, 1993 WL 649283 
(Me. Dec. 7, 1993); In re Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741(Minn.1994); Applicants v. Texas State Bd. 
of Law Examiners, No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 776693 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1993). 
See also Scheffey, supra note 14, at 11 (quoting Leonard S. Rubenstein, director of the 
Mental Health Law Project in Washington, D.C. as saying, "People are coming out of the 
woodwork .••• I'm hearing from more and more bar applicants on this issue."). 
17. 1994 WL 776693. 
18. "Within the last ten years, have you been diagnosed with or have you been treated 
[for] bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia, or any other psychotic disorder?" 1994 WL 
776693, at *10 n.5. 
19. "[The question and subsequent investigation] are necessary to ensure the integrity of 
the Board's licensing procedure, as well as to provide a practical means of striking an appro-
priate balance between important societal goals.'' 1994 WL 776693, at *9. For a discussion of 
the necessity exception to the ADA and its applicability to bar examiners, see infra Part III. 
The Texas court also held that the inquiry and investigation process actually furthers the 
goal of the ADA to integrate individuals with mental disabilities into society by allowing 
individualized, case-by-case evaluations of competence. 1994 WL 776693, at *9; see also Mc-
cready v. Illinois Bd. of Admissions to the Bar, No. 94-C-3582, 1995 WL 29609, at *7 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 24, 1995) (agreeing with the Texas court and rejecting an ADA challenge to mental 
health investigation in general). 
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court in Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners20 held that a 
question about treatment or counseling within the previous five 
years21 did violate the ADA. The Virginia court also considered 
whether the question was "necessary," but held that the question 
was too broad and that its negative effects outweighed its utility.22 
Although it invalidated the Virginia Board's question, the court in-
dicated that the ADA would permit some form of mental health 
inquiry.23 
This Note disagrees with both of these cases and with the appar-
ent trend toward revising psychological history inquiries to make 
them seem narrower while continuing to base them on mental 
health status. This Note argues that the use of any questions based 
upon an applicant's psychological history in the state bar applica-
tion process violates the Americans with Disabilities Act. Part I 
demonstrates that Title II of the ADA24 applies to state boards of 
bar examiners, and that the ADA definition of a person with a disa-
bility includes a person who has sought or received psychological 
counseling. Part II applies the ADA and accompanying regulations 
to the psychological history inquiries currently used by state bar ex-
aminers and argues that such inquiries violate the ADA because 
they inquire specifically about disabled status. Part III argues that 
although Department of Justice regulations allow for a narrow ne-
cessity exception to the ADA, bar examiners' use of psychological 
background inquiries are not "necessary" because they are ineffec-
tive in determining applicants' fitness to practice law. Part IV as-
serts that the ADA permits questions relating to conduct and 
behavior, rather than past or present psychological status, and that 
such questions would adequately serve the bar examiners' purpose. 
I. APPLICABILITY OF THE ADA 
The Americans with Disabilities Act applies to state bar inquir-
ies into applicants' psychological histories. Section I.A contends 
This Note argues that, on the contrary, the inquiry itself constitutes impennissible dis-
crimination based on disability status and rooted in stereotypes. The fact that each applicant 
who answers the question affirmatively is then evaluated individually does not erase the fact 
that the initial "cut" that triggers the investigation is based on one's history of disability. See 
generally infra Part II. 
20. 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
21. "Have you within the past five (5) years been treated or counselled for any mental, 
emotional or nervous disorders?" 880 F. Supp. at 431. 
22. See 880 F. Supp. at 431, 446. 
23. See 880 F. Supp. at 436. The court referred to the Texas decision, but distinguished it 
rather than disagreed with it. See 880 F. Supp. at 444. 
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (Supp. V 1993). This Note actually considers only Title II, 
Part A, which applies generally to public services. Part B, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165 (Supp. V 
1993), applies specifically to public transportation pr_·1ided by public entities and is irrele-
vant to this discussion of state bar examiners. 
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that state boards of bar examiners are public entities subject to the 
ADA, and that Title II of the ADA applies to their procedures and 
criteria. Section I.B argues that the ADA protects individuals who 
have sought or received psychological treatment, or who have been 
misclassified as or are regarded as having psychological disorders. 
A. Applicability to Bar Examiners' Inquiries 
State boards of bar examiners, as instrumentalities of state judi-
cial branches, are public entities under the ADA and therefore sub-
ject to its provisions.zs Title II of the ADA provides that "no 
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disabil-
ity, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be sub-
jected to discrimination by any such entity."26 The definition of 
"public entity" includes "any ... agency ... or other instrumentality 
of a State or States or local government."27 The Department of Jus-
tice stated in its regulations implementing Title II28 and stated that 
the regulations apply to all programs or activities provided by pub-
lic entities.29 The DOJ explained that the scope of Title II coverage 
includes not only executive agencies, but also "activities of the leg-
islative and judicial branches of State and local governments. "30 
Title II and the accompanying regulations explicitly apply to 
state licensing and certification bodies, and therefore to state 
boards of bar examiners. A DOJ regulation prohibits public enti-
ties under Title II from "administer[ing] a licensing or certification 
25. See, e.g., Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 441 (E.D. Va. 
1995) ("The Virginia Board of Bar Examiners concedes that it is a public agency within [the 
ADA] definition."); Applicants v. Texas State Bd. of Law Examiners, No. A-93-CA-740-SS, 
1994 WL 776693, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1993) {"The Board as the state governmental 
agency responsible for licensing attorneys in the State of Texas is a public entity within the 
ADA definition."); In re Rubenstein, 637 A.2d 1131, 1136 (Del. 1994) {holding that the Dela-
ware Board of Bar Examiners, "as an instrumentality of this Court," was a public entity 
within the meaning of Title II); see also Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About 
Conduct, Not Mental Illness: A Proposal for Bar Examiners and Medical Boards_ to Comply 
with the ADA and Constitution, 20 J. LEGIS. 147, 174 n.169 (1994) (noting that the U.S. De-
partment of Justice asserted in an amicus brief in a New York case that a board of bar exam-
iners is an "instrumentality" of the state and therefore subject to Title II). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. V 1993). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1213l(l){B) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). 
28. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994). The DOJ regulations are relevant to the ADA analysis 
because they effectuate subtitle A ofTitle II. 28 C.F.R. § 35.101 (1994). Congress authorized 
the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to implement Title II, subtitle A. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12134(a) (Supp. V 1993); see also Kinney v. Yerusalem, 812 F. Supp. 547, 548 (E.D. Pa.), 
affd., 9 F.3d 1067 {3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1545 (1994) ("Rather than outline the 
specific obligations of public entities under [Title II], the ADA directed the Department of 
Justice ("DOJ") to promulgate regulations .•.• "). 
29. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102{a) (1994); see also 28 C.F.R. pt 35, app. A at 439 (1994). 
30. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 440 (1994). 
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program in a manner that subjects qualified individuals with disabil-
ities to discrimination on the basis of disability."31 
Title II of the ADA applies to state bar examiners' application 
and investigation procedures and criteria. Regulations implement-
ing Title II prohibit public entities from applying criteria that have 
the effect of differentiating people on the basis of disability unless 
such criteria are "necessary."32 Questions about and investigations 
into character and fitness are methods of administration that single 
out certain individuals on the basis of specified criteria, and there-
fore Title II applies to them.33 As public entities engaged in profes-
sional licensing, therefore, state boards of bar examiners are 
necessarily subject to the provisions of Title II of the ADA. 
B. Psychological Disorders 
This section argues that the Americans with Disabilities Act 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of psychological disorders,34 
even in cases where such disorders do not rise to the level of a disa-
bility as defined by the Act. 
The ADA protection against discrimination extends to individu-
als with psychological disorders. The statute defines a disability as 
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such an individual."35 The De-
partment of Justice further defined "mental impairment" to include 
any psychological disorder, or emotional or mental illness,36 and 
31. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (1994). 
32. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3) {1994) (stating that public entities are prohibited from 
"utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration ••. [t]hat have the effect of subjecting quali-
fied individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability"); 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.130(b)(8) (1994) (prohibiting public entities from "impos[ing] or apply[ing] eligibility 
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of 
individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any service, program, or activity, 
unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary"). 
33. One commentator has argued that "Title II would certainly apply to the standards 
governing the portion of the bar examination process involving the investigation of an appli-
cant's character and fitness." W. Sherman Rogers, The ADA, Title VII, and the Bar Exami-
nation: The Nature and Extent of the ADA's Coverage of Bar Examinations and an Analysis 
of the Applicability of Title VII to Such Tests, 36 How. L.J. 1, 7 (1993). 
34. For the purposes of this Note, the term "psychological" will include "mental," "ner-
vous," and "emotional." 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). The Department of Jus-
tice defined "major life activities" to mean "functions such as caring for one's self, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 28 
C.F.R. § 35.104 {1994). 
36. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994). The DOJ definition specifically excludes certain disorders: 
Transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity dis-
orders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; 
[c]ompulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or [p]sychoactive substance use dis-
orders resulting from current illegal use of drugs. 
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994). 
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has interpreted the definition to include drug addiction and 
alcoholism.37 
The ADA also protects individuals who have had psychological 
disorders in the past. The statutory definition of the term "disabil-
ity" includes "a record of" a substantially limiting physical or 
mental impairment.38 This definition applies both to people who 
have a history of an impairment and to those who have been mis-
classified as having an impairment.39 In the preamble to its inter-
pretive regulation, the DOJ explained that the definition seeks to 
protect people who have recovered from their previous impair-
ments by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of those past im-
pairments.40 As common examples of individuals that the statute 
protects, the DOJ referred to people who have recovered from 
mental or emotional illness and people who have been misclassified 
as mentally ill.41 
Finally, the ADA protects even those with psychological disor-
ders that would not qualify as disabilities. The statute defines "dis-
ability" to include "being regarded as having" a substantially 
limiting physical or mental impairment.42 The DOJ regulation con-
strues this language to apply to individuals who have an impairment 
that is not substantially limiting "but that is treated by a public en-
tity as constituting such a limitation,"43 and to individuals who have 
an impairment that is substantially limiting "only as a result of the 
attitudes of others."44 The preamble to the regulation emphasizes 
the importance of "perception" to this prong of the definition;45 
persons who are subjected to discrimination by a public entity be-
cause of "myths, fears, and stereotypes" are covered by the ADA 
regardless of whether their conditions would qualify as disabilities 
Notably, the Maine bar application asks only about these disorders, thereby avoiding an 
ADA violation. See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 439 n.18 (E.D. 
Va. 1995) (quoting Maine's question). 
37. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 {1994). The ADA explicitly excludes from protection individuals 
who are "currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs." 42 U.S.C. § 12114{a) (Supp. V 
1993); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.131(a){l) {1994). The statute does, however, protect individu-
als who are no longer engaging in illegal use or who are erroneously regarded as engaging in 
such use. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114{b) (Supp. V 1993); 28 C.F.R. § 35.131{a){2) {1994). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). 
39. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 {1994). 
40. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 444 {1994) {"This provision is included in the definition in 
part to protect individuals who have recovered from a physical or mental impairment that 
previously substantially limited them in a major life activity. Discrimination on the basis of 
such a past impairment is prohibited."). 
41. 28 C.F.R. pt 35, app. A at 444 (1994). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12102{2)(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
43. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 {1994). 
44. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 {1994). 
45. 28 C.F.R. pt 35, app. A at 445 {1994). 
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under either of the first two·prongs of the definition.46 Mental ill-
ness, regardless of whether it rises to the level of a disability, is 
frequently stigmatized by such stereotypes,47 and is therefore pro-
tected under the ADA. 
II. BAR EXAMINERS' USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HISTORY 
INQUIRIES 
This Part argues that bar examiners' use of inquiries into appli-
cants' psychological histories constitutes discrimination under the 
ADA. Section II.A demonstrates that Department of Justice regu-
lations promulgated under Title II of the ADA prohibit bar examin-
ers' use of psychological history inquiries. Section II.B contends 
that certain provisions in the ADA demonstrate Congress's intent 
to eliminate such inquiries. Section II.C argues that inquiries into 
psychological history violate the overarching purpose of the ADA 
to eliminate discrimination based on stigmas and stereotypes about 
mental illness. 
A. DOI Regulations 
The DOJ regulations promulgated under Title II forbid the use 
of inquiries into bar applicants' psychological backgrounds. In gen-
eral, public entities cannot use criteria that discriminate on the basis 
of disability.4s More specifically, they also cannot administer licens-
ing or certification programs in a manner that discriminates on the 
basis of disability.49 Title II also prohibits the imposition of any 
eligibility criteria that "screen out or tend to screen out" individuals 
with disabilities, unless the criteria are necessary.so 
Psychological history inquiries subject individuals with disabili-
ties to discrimination both by selecting out individuals who have or 
have previously had psychological disorders and by imposing addi-
tional burdens on them. The questions single out for special scru-
tiny many qualified individuals with disabilities or histories of 
46. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 445 (1994). This category is particularly important to the 
ADA analysis of psychological history inquiries because such inquiries single out individuals 
whose problems may never have risen to the level of a "disability." See infra section III.B.1. 
In addition, the inquiries are based on stereotypes about the competence of individuals with 
psychological problems. See generally infra section 11.C. 
47. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
48. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3) (1994) (stating that public entities may not "utilize criteria or 
methods of administration ... [t]hat have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with 
disabilities to discrimination on the basis of disability"); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) 
(Supp. V 1993) (using similar language in Title I to define one kind of discriminatory practice 
in the employment context). 
49. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6) (1994). 
50. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1994); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. V 1993) (using 
very similar language in Title I to define one kind of discriminatory practice in the employ-
ment context). For a discussion of necessary as it applies to Title II, see infra section III.A. 
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disabilities, and as such act as a "screening device."51 This screen-
ing triggers further investigation,52 which imposes additional bur-
dens only on people with disabilities, on the basis of their disabled 
status.53 
B. Congressional Intent 
Provisions in Title 154 of the ADA demonstrate Congress's in-
tent to prohibit inquiries about current or past disabilities. Title I 
provisions limiting medical inquiries to questions about ability and 
prohibiting questions about the existence, nature, or severity of dis-
abilities are significant to the interpretation of the entire Act.55 
51. See, for example, Medical Secy. v. Jacobs, No. CIV.A.93-3670, 1993 WL 413016 
(D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993), in which a federal district court discussed the impact of the DOJ regula-
tions on such inquiries. The court stated that many qualified individuals with disabilities or 
histories of disabilities would be "singled out" by the questions, which were a " 'screening' 
device." 1993 WL 413016, at *7. 
52. Affirmative answers to psychological history questions on bar examinations trigger 
further investigation. For instance, in the inquiry addressed in Jacobs, if an applicant an-
swered that he or she had been dependent on drugs or alcohol, had been treated for drug or 
alcohol abuse, or had suffered or been treated for any psychiatric problems, the applicant was 
required to have any treating physicians submit summaries of diagnosis, treatment, and prog-
nosis to the Board of Medical Examiners. 1993 WL 413016, at *l. 
53. The Jacobs court emphasized that the additional burden of extra investigations (see 
below), rather than the psychological history questions themselves, constituted invidious dis-
crimination under the ADA. 1993 WL 413016, at *8. The board could ask such questions, 
but could not use them to trigger further inquiries, which would burden individuals on the 
basis of disability. 
In Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994), another 
district court criticized the Jacobs court's limitation, calling it "questionable" and a "flawed 
conclusion." 859 F. Supp. at 1494 n.7. The Ellen S. court held that the DOJ regulations made 
clear that both the questions themselves and the subsequent inquiry discriminated by impos-
ing additional burdens based on disability. 859 F. Supp. at 1493-94. Similarly, the Maine 
Supreme Court held in In re Underwood, 1993 WL 649283, at *2 (Me. Dec. 7, 1993), that 
both the questions and the additional investigation violated the ADA and the accompanying 
regulations. 
Although the burden of answering additional questions, including some which may be 
quite intrusive, is in itself an additional burden, psychological history inquiries also impose 
other burdens on individuals who answer them affirmatively. See, e.g., Resnick, supra note 
14, at 34 (stating that, according to Nina E. Vinik, staff counsel for the ACLU of Florida, the 
additional investigations can delay applications for over a year, causing stress and added 
costs); Stephen T. Maher & Lori Blum, A Strategy for Increasing the Mental and Emotional 
Fitness of Bar Applicants, 23 IND. L. REv. 821, 829 (1990) (stating that, in addition to the 
anxiety caused by investigations, applicants suffer economically from the delay and from par-
ticipation in formal or informal proceedings, and suffer personally if character questions de-
lay admission and become public). 
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. V 1993). This Note points to Title I only to demon-
strate Congress's understanding that medical inquiries are discriminatory. The extent to 
which Congress intended to incorporate Title I provisions into Title II, if at all, is not settled. 
See infra note 57. 
55. One commentator has stated that "[a]rguably, the Title I prohibition against preem-
ployment inquiries concerning disability constitutes a public policy statement applicable 
throughout the ADA." Rogers, supra note 33, at 7. In fact, Title I does not impose such a 
prohibition only on preemployment inquiries; inquiries to employees are also limited to abil-
ity to perform. See infra notes 58, 59 and accompanying text. The implication of a public 
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Although Title II of the ADA does not provide a specific definition 
of "discrimination," Title I, which applies to private employers, 
specifies practices that constitute discrimination in the employment 
context,56 including medical inquiries.57 Title I limits employers' 
preemployment inquiries to questions about applicants' ability to 
perform job-related functions.58 Similarly, employers' inquiries to 
employees are also limited to ability to perform job-related func-
tions.59 After an employer has made a conditional offer of employ-
ment, the employer may require a medical examination only if all 
entering employees are subjected to the examination6o and if the 
policy against such inquiries, therefore, is even stronger than Professor Rogers's statement 
suggests. 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b), (d) (Supp. V 1993). Significantly, the DOJ regulations imple-
menting Title II borrowed language directly from the Title I definition of discrimination. See 
supra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text. 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp. V 1993). Congress intended Title II, which does not 
itself include a definition of what constitutes discrimination, to be read in light of Titles I and 
III, but the actual incorporation of specific provisions is ambiguous. The preamble to the 
DOJ regulations states that Title II "incorporates" the provisions of Titles I and III. 28 C.F.R 
pt 35, app. A at 440 (1994). Moreover, a House committee stated that the forms of discrimi-
nation prohibited by Title II (Part A] were intended to be "identical" to those in Titles I and 
III. See HOUSE CoMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, REPORT ON AMERICANS WITH DISABIL-
ITIES Acr OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 485, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 84 (1990), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 367. In providing examples, however, the Committee noticeably 
omitted discussing Title l's medical inquiry provisions. See Medical Socy. v. Jacobs, No. 
CIV.A.93-3670, 1993 WL 413016, at *10 (D.NJ. Oct. 5, 1993) (commenting on the omission). 
A Senate committee used different language, stating: "The forms of discrimination pro-
hibited by [Title II, Part Al are comparable to those set out in the applicable provisions of 
titles I and III of this legislation." SENATE CoMM. ON LABOR & HUMAN RESOURCES, RE· 
PORT ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr OF 1989, S. REP. No. 116, lOlst Cong., 1st 
Sess. 44 (1989). The apparently conflicting reports have left the exact relation between Titles 
I and II in doubt, particularly with regard to medical and psychological inquiries. The differ-
ence between "identical" and "comparable" may determine the extent to which opponents of 
bar examiners' inquiries can draw an analogy to preemployment inquiries. The Jacobs court 
stated that the committee reports "produce[d] an ambiguous picture." 1993 WL 413016, at 
*10. Another federal district court agreed that the extent to which Title II incorporates Title 
I is unclear, but held that the differences between Title II and Titles I and III, in light of the 
House Report, did not indicate, as the bar examiners had argued, that the inquiries prohib-
ited under Title I must be permissible under Title II. Ellen S. v. Florida Bd. of Bar Examin-
ers, 859 F. Supp. 1489, 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (denying defendant bar examiners' motion to 
dismiss an ADA challenge). 
For a discussion of the incorporation issue with regard to medical inquiries, see Coleman 
& Shellow, supra note 25, at 174-76 & n.172. 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (stating that a private employer "may 
make preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related func-
tions"). Because questions about ability to perform certain functions inquire about actual 
current capability, not disabled status, they do not violate the ADA. See infra note 98. 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (stating that a private employer "may 
make inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job-related functions"). 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993). A private employer can use results of 
medical examinations only if the examination is both job-related and necessary. See 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Even if bar examiners could argue that their in-
quiries are analogous to medical examinations, they would have to show the inquiries to be 
job-related and necessary. See infra Part III. 
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results are not used to discriminate against those with disabilities.61 
Aside from the narrow medical exam exception, employers cannot 
make any inquiries of job applicants or employees as to whether the 
applicants or employees have any disabilities or as to the nature or 
severity of such disabilities.62 
C. Elimination of Stereotypes 
This section argues that questions about psychological history 
violate the overarching purpose of the ADA: to eliminate the 
stigma and stereotypes associated with disability and to eradicate 
discrimination on the basis of such stereotypes. Because mental 
and psychological disorders are subjected to particularly severe 
stigma and negative stereotypes, this overarching purpose takes on 
added importance when these disabilities are implicated. 
The ADA itself contains explicit language that clearly expresses 
a policy of eliminating the stigma of disability. In its findings and 
purposes, Congress stated: 
[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who 
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a his-
tory of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of 
political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are 
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic 
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such indi-
viduals to participate in, and contribute to, society .... 63 
Congress also noted that people with disabilities continually experi-
ence discrimination in a number of forms, including exclusionary 
criteria,64 and that discrimination and prejudice continue to deny 
individuals with disabilities the opportunity to compete fairly and 
equally.6s Congress then stated that the purpose of the Act was to 
establish a clear national mandate for eliminating discrimination on 
the basis of disability.66 
In the preamble to its regulations promulgated under Title Il of 
the ADA, the Department of Justice echoed the statute's purpose. 
The preamble describes the law's "goal of protecting disabled indi-
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(D)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993) Gob applicants); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(D)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (employees). 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added). The "discrete and insular 
minority" language seems to suggest a possible equal protection approach. See generally 
Amy Scott Lowndes, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: A Congressional 
Mandate for Heightened Judicial Protection of Disabled Persons, 44 FLA. L. REv. 417 (1992). 
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993). 
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1210l(a)(9) (Supp. V 1993). One Note stated that the congressional 
findings "proclaim that individuals with disabilities labor under the additional burden of soci-
ety's ignorance, prejudice and stigmatization which inexorably widen the gulf between per-
ception and reality." Lowndes, supra note 63, at 448. 
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) (Supp. V 1993). 
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viduals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or un-
founded fear. "67 
The legislative history of the ADA also demonstrates Con-
gress's purpose to eliminate discrimination based on stereotypes. 
In their reports recommending passage of the ADA, committees in 
both the House and the Senate quoted the Supreme Court in 
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 68 stating that by including 
those "regarded as" impaired, Congress recognized that society's 
"myths and fears" about disabilities constrain people with disabili-
ties as much as the limitations resulting from actual impairment.69 
In the Senate debate on the bill, its sponsor, Senator Tom Harkin, 
argued: 
There is a wellspring of fears and unfounded prejudices about 
people with disabilities, unfounded fears, whether people have mental 
disorders, whether they are manic depressive[] or schizophreni[c] or 
paranoi[ d], or unfounded fears and prejudices based upon physical 
disabilities. The point of the bill is to start breaking down those barri-
ers of fear and prejudice and unfounded fears, to get past that point 
so that people begin to look at people based on their abilities, not first 
looking at their disability. 
That is really what the point of this legislation is ... to get past 
that initial barrier.10 
These statements make clear that Congress intended to eradicate 
judgments of ability based on myths about disabilities. 
Bar examiners' use of psychological history inquiries constitutes 
such a myth-based assessment. By requiring applicants to divulge 
information about their status with regard to certain disabilities, bar 
examiners begin with the presumption that any psychological disa-
67. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 446 {1994) (emphasis added); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. 
A at 449 (expressing the Department of Justice's goal of protecting the disabled from "pre-
sumptions, patronizing attitudes, fears, and stereotypes" about people with disabilities). 
One commentator has argued that "[t]he ADA gives legal protection against ill· 
considered stereotypes." Leonard S. Rubenstein, Mental Disorder and the ADA, in lMPLE· 
MENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr 209, 214 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry 
A. Beyer eds., 1993). 
68. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). Arline involved the third prong of the definition of a disability 
under a regulation implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 
93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) 
(preventing discrimination on the basis of disability by the federal government), which was 
copied by the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12132 {Supp. V 1993). 
69. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
Acr OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 485, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 30 (1990) (quoting Arline, 
480 U.S. at 284), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453; SENATE COMM. oN LABOR & 
HUMAN RESOURCES, REPORT ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr OF 1989, S. REP. 
No. 116, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989) (quoting same). 
70. 135 CoNo. REc. 19,866 (1989} (statement of Sen. Harkin). Significantly, Senator 
Harkin made this statement in the context of a discussion of employers' inquiries into job 
applicants' psychological histories. Shortly before, Senator Jesse Helms had asked Senator 
Harkin whether potential employers could "ask regarding a history of psychosis, neurosis, or 
other mental, psychological disease or disorder." Id.; cf. supra section II.B. 
October 1995] Note - Psychological History Inquiries 179 
bility may be a sign of unfitness to practice. Even if nearly every 
affected applicant is approved following an investigation, the initial 
categorization is based on stereotypes about mental and psychologi-
cal disorders. This kind of stereotype-based inquiry is discrimina-
tory on the basis of disabled status, in direct contradiction of the 
congressional intent behind the ADA. 
Furthermore, mental and psychological disabilities are espe-
cially stigmatized in comparison with other disabilities. Individuals 
with psychological disorders or histories of such conditions face 
unique stigmas based on stereotypes about psychological 
problems.71 In fact, disclosure of treatment may itself be an "is-
sue," giving rise to a myth-based assumption of de:ficiency.72 
The legislative history of the ADA recognized the special ste-
reotypes and prejudices attached to mental illness. In the debate on 
the Senate floor, Senator Pete Domenici discussed the stigma at-
tached to psychological conditions. He described the common asso-
ciation of the term "mental illness" with what he termed a few of 
"the most serious mental illnesses," schizophrenia and manic-
depression.73 He later said that people with mental illnesses de-
serve to be evaluated based on their actual capability rather than on 
some assumed disability that others just associate with the name of 
a particular condition.74 
III. THE NECESSITY EXCEPTION TO THE ADA 
Having shown in Part II that the use of psychological history 
questions constitutes impermissible discrimination under the ADA, 
this Note now analyzes whether such inquiries fall under the neces-
sity exception to the ADA prohibition of discrimination. Although 
71. One commentator has suggested that "in the world of disabilities, mental impair-
ments have greater stigmas associated with them than do other disabilities." John W. Parry, 
Mental Disabilities Under the ADA: A Difficult Path to Follow, 17 MENTAL & PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY L. REP. 100, 110 (1993). He found evidence of those greater stigmas in the ADA 
itself, noting that some of the excluded conditions, such as compulsions and sexual disorders, 
are those with the greatest stigmas, id. at 100, and that most of the excluded conditions are 
psychological, id. at 110. For a complete list of the excluded conditions, see supra notes 36-
37. 
72. Rubenstein, supra note 67, at 214. Rubenstein attributed this assumption to "social 
prejudices against and myths and stereotypes about people with mental disorders." Id. at 
218. 
73. 135 CoNG. R.Ec. 19,878 (1989) (statement of Sen. Domenici). Senator Domenici went 
on to state: 
[T]here are hundreds of thousands of Americans today who have been diagnosed or are 
being treated for manic-depression, bipolar [a]ffective disease or schizophrenia, and I do 
believe we have to make a serious effort to eliminate the automatic stigma attached to 
those ailments .... We all perceive some idea in our Ininds about people who have those 
kinds of ailments. It turns out that more times than not, we are wrong in o[u]r percep-
tions of their abilities. We certainly overstate their disabilities. 
Id. 
74. See id. 
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the ADA and the DOJ regulations do permit discrimination under 
certain excepted circumstances, this Part argues that state boards of 
bar examiners cannot justify their inquiries into applicants' psycho-
logical histories under the exception. Section III.A describes the 
necessity exception to the ADA allowed by the Department of Jus-
tice regulations. Section III.B argues that even if unfit attorneys' 
threat to the public is sufficient to trigger the exception, inquiries 
into psychological history do not serve their intended purpose and 
therefore cannot meet the narrow exception. 
A. The Meaning of "Necessity" 
The DOJ regulations promulgated under Title II of the ADA 
allow a necessity exception. A public entity cannot impose eligibil-
ity criteria that tend to screen out individuals with disabilities "un-
less such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of 
the service, program, or activity."75 Similarly, in the preamble to 
the regulations, the DOJ explained that neutral criteria that tend to 
screen out individuals with disabilities are permissible "if the crite-
ria are necessary for the safe operation of the program in ques-
tion. "76 The preamble states the exception in even narrower terms, 
allowing public entities to discriminate against an individual only if 
that individual "poses a direct threat to the health or safety of 
others. "77 The preamble also gives examples of justifiable safety 
qualifications, such as eligibility requirements for drivers' licenses 
or a swimming proficiency prerequisite for a rafting trip.78 Any 
safety requirements that a public entity imposes must be based on 
actual risks, rather than on speculation or stereotypes about indi-
viduals with disabilities.79 Given the narrow language in both the 
regulation and the preamble, and the directness and tangibility of 
the threat in each of the examples in the preamble, the exception 
must be read narrowly.so 
75. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1994) (emphases added). 
76. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 452 (1994) (emphasis added). 
77. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 446 (1994) (emphasis added). 
78. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 452 {1994). Significantly, these examples suggest that the 
DOJ related the safety exception to immediate, tangible dangers, such as the physical threat 
that a driver or rafter unable to meet the physical demands the task would pose, as opposed 
to the kind of threat that an unstable attorney might pose to his or her clients' interests or to 
the integrity of the profession. This might suggest that bar examiners could never use the 
exception. This Note will assume for the sake of argument that the exception could apply if 
the questions were narrow enough. 
79. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 452 (1994). The preamble also expresses the ADA's goal 
of protecting the disabled from discrimination based on unfounded stereotypes "while giving 
appropriate weight to legitimate concerns, such as the need to avoid exposing others to sig-
nificant health and safety risks." 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 446 {1994) (emphasis added). 
80. 1\vo recent federal district court cases applied the necessity exception to bar examin-
ers' use of psychological history inquiries, with differing degrees of narrowness and with dif-
fering results. Compare Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 441-42, 
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B. Psychological History Inquiries and the Necessity Test 
This section argues that bar examiners' inquiries into applicants' 
psychological backgrounds are not within the permitted exception 
because they are not necessary; they do not serve their intended 
purpose and instead are based on stereotypes and misconceptions. 
Section III.B.1 argues that the questions are overinclusive, singling 
out many individuals who are mentally and emotionally fit and ca-
pable for the practice of law. Section ID.B.2 asserts that questions 
about past psychological status are unreliable for evaluation of 
present and future fitness to practice law because past mental ill-
ness is a poor predictor of present and future fitness. Finally, sec-
tion III.B.3 demonstrates that the use of these questions is actually 
counterproductive to the goal of protecting the public, in that it de-
ters law students from seeking psychological treatment or 
assistance. 
1. Overinclusiveness 
Inquiries into psychological history are overbroad and ineffec-
tive because they single out many individuals who are not unfit. 
Although bar examiners argue that such inquiries assist them in 
screening applicants for fitness to practice law by identifying people 
with a proven potential for psychological instability,s1 the questions 
also identify people who are mentally and emotionally healthy and 
stable and who are not likely to prove unfit. Questions regarding 
psychological background ignore both the varying degrees of sever-
ity of condition and the possibility of recovery, and impose addi-
tional and intrusive burdens upon individuals without regard to the 
severity of their previous conditions or to the extent of their recov-
ery. As a result, these inquiries not only identify applicants who 
may at one time have been unfit to practice law but who have re-
covered completely, but also single out applicants who were never 
unfit.82 Those individuals may have suffered from only minor psy-
446 (E.D. Va. 1995) (applying the necessity exception narrowly and holding that the Virginia 
inquiry did not fall under the exception because the board had presented no evidence sug-
gesting that "all or most" of the applicants answering the question in the affirmative 
threatened public health or safety) with Applicants v. Texas State Bd. of Law Examiners, No. 
A-93-CA-740-SS, 1994 WL 776693, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 1994) (interpreting the excep-
tion more broadly and holding that a mental health question was necessary to ensure that 
lawyers were "morally and mentally" capable of practicing law). The Texas court also stated 
that the inquiry was "necessary to ensure the integrity of the Board's licensing procedure, as 
well as to provide a practical means of striking an appropriate balance between important 
societal goals." 1994 WL 776693, at *9. Whereas the Virginia court correctly applied the 
DOJ language because it focused on whether there was an actual threat to public safety, the 
Texas court ignored the language and the examples in the DOJ preamble and applied a 
broader version of "necessity" that the regulatory exception does not support. 
81. See, e.g., Moeser, supra note 13. 
82. Assuming arguendo that an individual who is disabled by a psychological disorder is 
unfit to practice law, even questions regarding diagnosis of mental illness are overinclusive. 
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chological problems, or may have been misdiagnosed or misclassi-
fied as ill but actually were never afflicted at all.83 In addition, the 
questions regarding treatment84 single out individuals who sought 
treatment but who were never mentally ill.85 Inquiries into psycho-
logical history screen· out for further investigation applicants who 
are not and perhaps never were mentally or emotionally unfit to 
practice law.86 Such inquiries are therefore too broad and inclusive 
to identify individuals who may pose a threat to the public. 
2. Unreliability 
Psychological history inquiries are also unreliable for evaluation 
of applicants' fitness to practice law. First, the records of mental 
health professionals who treated an applicant in the past are irrele-
vant to that applicant's current or future condition and ability to 
practice.87 Psychological records are not a reliable predictor of be-
A recent study found that only one-third of the 28 percent of Americans suffering from 
diagnosable mental illnesses are disabled by their conditions. Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. 
Shellow, Fitness to Practice Law: A Question of Conduct, Not Mental Illness, 68 FLA. B.J. 71, 
72, 74 n.9 (May 1994) (citing Darrell A. Regier et al., The de Facto US Mental and Affective 
Disorders Service System: Epidemiologic Catchment Area Prospective I-Year Prevalence 
Rates of Disorders and Services, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PsYCHOL. 85 (1993)). 
83. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text (citing questions about treatment and 
about diagnosis); supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing ADA protection of 
individuals misclassified as or regarded as having or having had a disability). 
84. See supra note 6. 
85. A recent study by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) found that 46 
percent of those treated by mental health professionals have no diagnosable mental illness. 
See Coleman & Shellow, supra note 82, at 72, 74 n.10 (citing William E. Narrow et al., Use of 
Services by Persons with Mental and Addictive Disorders; Findings from National Institute of 
Mental Health, Epidemiologic Catchment Program, 50 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHOL. 95 (1993)). 
86. It is worth noting that psychological background questions also miss some of their 
intended targets completely, failing to single out individuals who may be unfit Although the 
purpose of the questions is to identify applicants who may pose a threat to the public, the 
inquiries overlook applicants who may in fact pose a significant risk but who have never 
sought treatment for their conditions or been diagnosed as mentally ill. See supra notes 6, 8 
and accompanying text (citing questions about treatment and/or diagnosis). Those applicants 
may well be more dangerous than those whom the inquiries do single out; they may have 
serious psychological impairments that remain untreated. See Maher & Blum, supra note 53, 
at 829 ("The fact that applicants have not sought treatment is not proof that treatment is not 
needed. Indeed, the group needing the most attention may be those who have difficulties, 
but have not sought treatment."). Researchers have found that only one-third of Americans 
with diagnosable mental illnesses consult mental health professionals. Coleman & Shellow, 
supra note 82, at 72. Those individuals would answer bar examiners' psychological back-
ground questions in the negative, and therefore would not trigger further investigation. 
87. " 'There's no basis for concluding that someone who has undergone psychiatric treat-
ment, that they're unfit to practice .... You simply can't draw any conclusion from it.' " John 
Murawski, Can Bar Examiners Seek Psychiatric Records?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at 1, 
13 (quoting Leonard Rubenstein, Executive Director of the Mental Health Law Project). 
" 'Prior psychiatric treatment is, per se, not relevant to the question of current impair-
ment'" Clark v. Virginia Bd. ofBar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 435 (E.D. Va. 1995) (quot-
ing the American Psychiatric Association guidelines for mental health inquiries by licensing 
boards). See also Mary Elizabeth Cisneros, A Proposal to Eliminate Broad Mental Health 
Inquiries on Bar Examination Applications: Assessing an Applicant's Fitness to Practice Law 
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havior, since the range and severity of individuals' problems vary.ss 
Even trained mental health professionals usually cannot accurately 
predict an individual's psychological incapacities based on his or 
her past treatment.89 In addition, the presumption, upon which bar 
examiners base their use of psychological inquiries, that psychologi-
cal problems are connected to ability to handle stress may be 
wrong.9° Because previous mental and emotional problems are un-
reliable for determining an applicant's present and future fitness 
and capacity, psychological background questions fail to aid bar ex-
aminers in evaluating applicants' ability to practice. 
3. Deterrence 
Finally, bar examiners' inquiries into applicants' psychological 
histories are actually counterproductive to the goal of protecting 
the public from unfit lawyers, in that they deter law students from 
seeking psychological treatment or counseling.91 Knowing that 
they will have to disclose any sessions with mental health profes-
by Alternative Means, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL Ennes 401, 421-25 (1995) (arguing that past mental 
health treatment is not predictive of future conduct). 
88. Even with information about a current psychological problem, [bar examiners] can-
not, by virtue of that fact alone, make any reliable predictions about the attorney's fit-
ness to practice law. The range and severity of psychological problems is so great that no 
reviewers, no matter how expert, could make reliable judgments about fitness except in 
the most egregious cases. 
Bar Examiners Run Afoul of New Disabilities Law, CoNN. L. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1992, at 10, 11 
(quoting a plaintiff's memorandum in a Connecticut case). 
89. See Rhode, supra note 4, at 582 (arguing that "even trained clinicians cannot accu-
rately predict psychological incapacities based on past treatment in most individual cases") 
(citation omitted); id. at 559-60. Rhode also maintained that current standards of certifica-
tion permit untrained bar examiners "to draw inferences that the mental health community 
would itself find highly dubious." Id. at 582. Similarly, Stephen Maher and Dr. Lori Blum 
suggested that bar examiners, "at some point in the process, act as amateur psychiatrists." 
Maher & Blum, supra note 53, at 838 (citation omitted). 
90. See Rubenstein, supra note 67, at 214. Similarly, Deborah Rhode referred to mental 
stability as "dubiously relevant to practice." Rhode, supra note 4, at 581-82. 
91. See Maher & Blum, supra note 53, at 830-33 (arguing the likelihood of deterrence in 
more detail); see also Laura F. Rothstein, Bar Admissions and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, Hous. LAW., SeptJOct. 1994, at 34, 39 ("The danger of asking [mental health] questions 
is that individuals who may know that they will have to answer them may avoid seeking 
counseling for depression and other conditions because of concerns that bar authorities 
might view such treatment negatively."). 
At least two courts have recognized this potentially strong deterrent effect. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court based its decision striking several psychological background questions 
from the state bar application in part upon the chilling effect such questions had on law 
students. In re Frickey, 515 N.W.2d 741, 741 (Minn. 1994) ("[F]inding that the prospect of 
having to answer the mental health questions in order to obtain a license to practice causes 
many law students not to seek necessary counseling weighs against asking the questions 
.... "). 
A federal district court also considered the possibility of deterrence. Clark v. Virginia Bd. 
of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 445-46 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("[T]here is ample support, from 
the testimony of [several expert witnesses] for the conclusion that [the mental health inquiry] 
deters applicants from seeking mental health counseling from which they might otherwise 
benefit."). 
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sionals, many law students choose to postpone counseling for stress, 
marital· difficulties, and even drug and alcohol problems.92 The in-
quiries discourage law students from developing their mental and 
emotional fitness and strategies for coping with stress before enter-
ing the profession; without adequate preparation for the stress of 
legal practice, they may turn to "unhealthy coping strategies, such 
as drug or alcohol abuse. "93 
The bar examiners' additional investigations, involving required 
disclosure of patient records, also have a chilling effect on law stu-
dents' treatment when they do seek it; if the therapist and the pa-
tient know that their interaction will be disclosed to the bar, the 
dynamic may change.94 The patient may not be as candid as she 
would otherwise be, and the therapist may alter the treatment.95 
The deterrent effect of bar examiners' psychological background in-
quiries discourages law students from seeking effective psychiatric 
treatment.96 
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE:. BEHAVIOR-CONDUCT QUESTIONS 
Bar examiners' psychological history inquiries rely on stereo-
types as a substitute for evaluations of ability and on status as a 
substitute for behavior. Bar examiners are not trained psycholo-
Ironically, law students may be especially in need of psychological treatment. An expert 
witness, Dr. Howard V. Zonana, in one ADA case testified that "between twenty and forty 
percent of all law students have 'significant depression symptoms.'" Clark v. Virginia Bd. of 
Bar Examiners, 861 F. Supp. 512, 517 (E.D. Va. 1994) vacated, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 
1995). 
This has also been noted by other commentators: 
Law school is not only stressful, it may actually promote unfitness. Empirical studies 
have shown that when compared to medical and other graduate students, law students 
experience greater stress. Symptoms of that stress include increased depression, anger, 
hostility, anxiety, social alienation, and obsessive-compulsive behavior. Such symptoms 
increase during law school so that third-year students and graduates tend to be more 
symptomatic than first[-]year students. 
Maher & Blum, supra note 53, at 843 (citations omitted). See id. at 843 nn.73, 74 (citing 
studies that found that law students had higher stress levels and more depression, anger, and 
hostility than medical and/or other graduate students). The authors also argued that "[l]aw 
students do not know how to handle the stress of law school effectively." Id. at 843. Addi· 
tionally, they cited one study that found that 43 percent of law students reported excessive 
drinking. Id. at 844 n.77 (citing Marilyn Heins et al., Law Students and Medical Students: A 
Comparison of Perceived Stress, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 511, 522 (1983)). 
92. Resnick, supra note 14, at 34. 
93. Maher & Blum, supra note 53, at 824. 
94. See id. at 834. 
95. See id. 
96. As one commentator has noted: "To the extent that bar oversight deters psychologi· 
cal or psychiatric treatment, the current approach is simply perverse. Penalizing those who 
recognize a need for assistance is unlikely to yield greater mental health among the practicing 
bar," Rhode, supra note 4, at 582. 
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gists, and may tend to rely on stereotypes and status in their 
evaluations.97 
This Part proposes that state boards of bar examiners abandon 
the use of inquiries into applicants' psychological histories and in-
stead inquire as to past behavior and conduct that might indicate 
inadequacies of fitness and capacity. Section IV.A argues that 
questions based upon status are impermissible, and that questions 
based upon conduct are permissible. Section IV.B argues that 
behavior-based inquiries are sufficient for bar examiners' purpose 
of screening applicants who pose a potential threat to the public. 
Section IV.C then suggests questions that bar examiners should use 
instead of psychological history inquiries. 
A. Permissibility 
Psychological history questions and the further investigations 
that may ensue are based upon the status of having psychological 
problems, rather than upon applicants' past behavior or conduct. 
As an antidiscrimination statute, the ADA prohibits discrimination 
based on disabled status.98 Therefore, bar examiners must limit 
their inquiries to information about conduct. 
In a case involving bar examiners' inquiries outside the ADA 
context, the New York Court of Appeals relied upon the status/ 
conduct distinction to invalidate questions about bankruptcy status 
and to limit bar examiners to conduct-related questions.99 The In re 
Anonymous court stated that the Bankruptcy Act was intended to 
protect debtors from "discrimination ... based upon the fact of 
bankruptcy,"100 so a determination of unfitness "must rest not on 
the fact of bankruptcy but on conduct reasonably viewed as com-
patible with a lawyer's duties and responsibilities as a member of 
the Bar."101 The court held that the statute did not shield debtors 
97. One commentator has argued that psychological background questions are "more a 
product of stereotypes than [questions] about people's fitness." Leonard Rubenstein, execu-
tive director of the Mental Health Law Project, quoted in Murawski, supra note 87, at 1. 
98. This Note uses the term "status" to mean the state of having a covered condition. 
Under the ADA, an individual who has, or has had, or has been regarded as having a mental 
or psychological impairment qualifies for ADA protection. See supra section I.B. He or she 
cannot be subjected to discrimination on the basis of the past or present disability - in other 
words, on the status of being disabled. "Conduct" and "behavior," on the other hand, merely 
refer to what an individual has or has not done, apart from considerations of his or her status. 
A recent custody case relied upon the status/conduct distinction with regard to the ADA. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a motion to compel disclosure of a parent's mental 
health history, stating that "[c]ertainly, with the adoption of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, the conduct of the parties rather than their mental status must be the focus of the court." 
Granbery v. Carleton, No. FA92-0058677, 1993 WL 547295, at *l (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 
1993). 
99. In re Anonymous, 549 N.E.2d 472 (N.Y. 1989). 
100. 549 N.E.2d at 473. 
101. 549 N.E.2d at 473-74. 
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from reasonable questions about their ability to manage money 
when the ability to do so was related to fitness for a license.102 
More recently, a federal district court held that although a com-
mittee of bar examiners could not reject an applicant on the basis of 
mental illness per se, it could inquire into conduct that could rea-
sonably be viewed as incompatible with the practice of law and dis-
approve him because of that conduct, even if he claimed that the 
objectionable conduct was a result of his mental illness.103 
Although the plaintiff claimed a violation of ADA Title n,104 the 
court did not mention the ADA in its analysis. 
Other courts have applied similar analyses in· cases that do rely 
upon the ADA. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
recognized the ADA's impact on status-based questions about psy-
chological history. In Medical Society v. Jaco.bs, 10s the court stated: 
The essential problem with [psychological background] questions is 
that they substitute an impermissible inquiry into the status of dis-
abled applicants for the proper, indeed necessary, inquiry into the ap-
plicants' behavior. In the context of other antidiscrimination statutes, 
it has been held to be fundamental that an individual's status cannot 
be used to make generalizations about that individual's behavior.106 
The court then suggested that the Board of Medical Examiners 
could formulate effective questions that would be permissible, 
screening . applicants "based only on their behavior and capabili-
ties," including questions about employment history, ability to han-
dle certain stressful situations, and fulfillment of responsibilities.101 
B. Sufficiency 
Permissible inquiries into conduct and behavior to determine 
fitness are sufficient to serve bar examiners' purpose of protecting 
the public. A member of the Committee on Admissions of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals has stated that, in the commit-
102. 549 N.E.2d at 473. 
103. See Campbell v. Greisberger, 865 F. Supp. 115, 121 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
104. 865 F. Supp. at 116. 
105. No. CIV.A.93-3670, 1993 WL 413016 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993). 
106. 1993 WL 413016, at *7 (emphasis added). 
107. 1993 WL 413016, at *7 (emphasis added); see also In re Underwood, 1993 WL 
649283, at *2 (Me. Dec. 7, 1993) (applying the Jacobs analysis to bar examiners' inquiries and 
invalidating status-based questions regarding mental illness, adding that "it is certainly per-
missible for the Board of Bar Examiners to fashion other questions more directly related to 
behavior that can affect the practice of law without violating the ADA") (emphasis added). 
The Jacobs court noted that under the ADA examiners may discriminate based on current 
illegal use of drugs. 1993 WL 413016, at *7; see supra notes 36-37. 
Questions about current ability to perform certain functions do not implicate the ADA 
because they do not rely on status with regard to disability. Cf. supra notes 58-59 and accom-
panying text. Inquiries limited to capability therefore do not violate the ADA. 
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tee's experience, the question as to treatment or counseling for 
drug or alcohol use 
has rarely, if ever, brought to light a serious fitness question that was 
not highlighted by other information (concerning litigation, employ-
ment, encounters with legal authorities, academic or bar discipline, 
etc.). In contrast, the committee's experience has been that alcohol 
and substance abuse problems are not infrequently associated with 
conduct raising very serious fitness problems.108 
This argument also applies to psychological problems not related to 
substance use; if an applicant is unfit to practice law because of 
mental or emotional instability, some aspect of his or her, conduct 
or behavior will probably reveal the problem.109 Given the severe 
flaws in the current, invalid, status-based approach,110 a more fo-
cused, conduct-based approach would be at least as effective as the 
prohibited inquiries.111 
At least two courts have decided that a narrower·, conduct-based 
inquiry would be sufficiently effective for bar examiners' purposes. 
The court in Jacobs stated that psychological history inquiries were 
unnecessary and that it was confident that the board of rnedical ex-
aminers could formulate "a set of effective questions" based only 
on conduct and capability.112 Similarly, the court in In re Frickey113 
rested its ruling invalidating bar examiners' psychol_ogical history 
questions in part on the court's belief that questions·relating to con-
duct are equally effective in protecting the public from unfit 
practitioners.114 
108. Reischel, supra note 14, at 11. In addition, according to Maher and Blum, drug and 
alcohol use and abuse are "fast becoming a primary focus of bar examiners" anyway. Maher 
& Blum, supra note 53, at 860. 
109. Psychological fitness problems that are serious enough to interfere with competent 
legal practice probably will manifest themselves in other areas of life involving responsibility, 
integrity, and stress management; a psychological incapacity that would render an individual 
unfit to practice law seems intuitively unlikely to be isolated to one specific area of that 
individual's life. 
For example, claiming that medical health professionals cannot conclusively predict fu-
ture difficulties "in any but the clearest cases of incapacity," Deborah Rhode suggested that 
"[i]t is doubtful that many individuals fitting that diagnosis are capable of successfully com-
pleting law school, passing a bar exam, and establishing a practice in which unsuspecting 
clients or colleagues will be at risk." Rhode, supra note 4, at 560. 
110. See supra section 111.B. 
111. In fact, evidence of past behavior may be the best indicator of an applicant's present 
ability and fitness to practice. See Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 
435-36 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citing the opinion of Dr. Howard V. Zonana, an expert witness for 
the plaintiff). 
112. 1993 WL 413016, at *7. 
113. 515 N.W.2d 741 (Me. 1994). 
114. 515 N.W.2d at 741. 
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C. Proposals for a Conduct-Based Inquiry 
In formulating conduct-based inquiries to detect unfitness to 
practice law, bar examiners should focus on certain aspects of appli-
cants' lives and backgrounds, such as employment, disciplinary ac-
tion (particularly within employment or academic institutions), and 
encounters with legal authorities. The Jacobs court has adopted 
this type of approach, suggesting that bar examiners screen based 
on employment history and whether applicants "have been unrelia-
ble, neglected work, or failed to live up to responsibilities. "115 The 
court also suggested that bar examiners ask applicants about their 
ability to "perform certain tasks or deal with certain emotionally or 
physically demanding situations";116 though not specifically 
conduct-based, such an inquiry would screen applicants on their ac-
tual ability rather than on status or stereotypes, and therefore 
would be permissible under the ADA. 
Some boards of bar examiners already use conduct- and 
behavior-based questions to elicit information about applicants' fit-
ness for legal practice.117 Commentators have made some useful 
suggestions for bar examiners who want to ask conduct-based ques-
tions. For example, Phyllis Coleman and Ronald A. Shellow sug-
gest that bar examiners ask the following questions: 
Have you ever been expelled, suspended from, or had disciplinary 
action taken against you by any educational institution? ... 
Has your grade point average ever varied by half a letter grade or 
more between two terms? ... 
Have you ever been absent from school or a job for more than 30 
consecutive days? ... 
Have you ever been fired from, or asked to leave, or had discipli-
nary action taken against you in any job? ... 
Have you ever been evicted or asked to vacate a place in which 
you lived? ... 
Have you ever been arrested for D.U.I.? ... 
115. Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016, at *7. 
116. Jacobs, 1993 WL 413016, at *7. 
117. See, e.g., Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430, 432 n.3 (E.D. Va. 
1995) (including in a footnote the board's list of factors that could trigger further inquiry). 
Besides mental health problems, the factors enumerated in Clark include: commission or 
conviction of a crime; academic misconduct; making false statements or omissions on the 
application; misconduct in employment; other than honorable discharge from a branch of the 
armed service; acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; abuse of legal 
process; failure to meet financial responsibilities; neglect of professional obligations; violation 
of a court order; denial of admission to another bar on character and fitness grounds; discipli-
nary action, whether resolved or pending, by any professional disciplinary agency; unauthor-
ized practice of law, or unresolved complaints thereof; and any other conduct that raises 
doubts as to character or fitness. 880 F. Supp. at 432 n.3. 
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Have you had any blackouts or periods of intoXication associated 
with alcohol or any other drug within the past six months?118 
According to Coleman and Shellow, these questions focus narrowly 
on past conduct and behavior that would signal an individual's un-
fitness to practice law.119 
Bar examiners should use inquiries that examine applicants' be-
havior and conduct in academic and employment settings, and in 
fulfillment of other responsibilities, to single out for further investi-
gation applicants who may be unfit to handle legal practice. 
CONCLUSION 
Most state bar applications currently include questions about 
applicants' past psychological conditions or treatment. Although 
the need to screen for fitness may be legitimate, boards of bar ex-
aminers that use· psychological history questions violate both the 
language and the purpose of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
Such inquiries treat status with regard to past or present disabilities 
as a proxy for ability, which is precisely the kind of assumption that 
Congress sought to eliminate. 
The apparent trend among both bar examiners and courts to 
consider narrower psychological history inquiries permissible under 
the ADA fails to recognize the inherent invalidity of such inquiries. 
Questions about an individual's past or present psychological condi-
tion or treatment are questions about his or her protected status. 
Whether bar examiners limit their inquiries to the last five or ten 
years or to specific psychological disorders is irrelevant - they still 
ask about a status that is protected by law. Merely narrowing the 
scope of status-based questions does not cure their illegality. 
To comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act, bar exam-
iners must discontinue the use of psychological history inquiries and 
rely instead on questions about applicants' past conduct and behav-
ior, and about their current capability. Discontinuing the use of 
psychological history questions will help achieve an essential goal of 
118. Coleman & Shellow, supra note 82, at 73-74. The authors also proposed these ques-
tions in Coleman & Shellow, supra note 25, at 177. 
119. Coleman & Shellow, supra note 82, at 73·74. 
Other suggestions for bar examiners interested in asking conduct·based questions can be 
found in the work of Stephen Maher and Dr. Lori Blum, who suggest that bar examiners 
focus the initial inquiry on "whether applicants have had serious life problems," rather than 
on whether they have sought or received treatment or counseling. Maher & Blum, supra 
note 53, at 859. An indication that an applicant has experienced serious life problems should 
raise the question of fitness and trigger further inquiry. Id. "Serious life problems" include 
some of the examples cited by Charles Reischel: employment difficulties, encounters with 
legal authorities, and academic discipline. See Reischel, supra note 14, at 11; supra note 108 
and accompanying text. It is worth noting however, that Maher & Blum published just 
before the passage of the ADA in 1990: hence their suggestions were not specifically in· 
tended to ensure compliance with the ADA. 
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the ADA: eliminating the stigma associated with disabilities, 
mental or otherwise. To allow bar examiners to inquire about the 
past mental health status of applicants perpetuates this stigma. 
